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Abstract
The invasiveness of aspects is beneficial to modularize
crosscutting concerns that require the modification of the
data or control flow. However, it introduces subtle errors
that are hard to locate and fix in case of evolution. In this
paper we illustrate this issue by evolving a program imple-
mented using aspects. Interaction issues, between aspects
and the program, emerge from this evolution. We locate them
through manual inspection and test execution. This tedious
process motivates the need for an abstract specification of in-
tended interactions. To tackle this issue, we propose a frame-
work for specifying the types of invasiveness pattern that are
allowed of forbidden in the program. We have also imple-
mented a tool that automatically checks whether the specifi-
cation is satisfied by the aspects.
1. Introduction
Aspect-oriented programming (AOP) is a paradigm that
enhances current approaches to modularizing software. AOP
enables separation of concerns that crosscut the implementa-
tion of a system. This is done by encapsulating crosscutting
concerns into single units called aspects. An aspect itself
is composed of several units realizing the crosscutting be-
havior, these units are called Advices. Aspects also provide
pointing elements that designate well defined points in the
program execution or structure. These are the points where
the program executes the crosscutting behavior. Generally
the pointers are called point-cut and the execution points
Join-points. Different approaches to AOP have been pro-
posed [8, 10, 13, 3]. Each of these approaches provide a
different mechanism to compose aspects with the base pro-
gram (main concern). These composition mechanisms range
from simple program augmentation to more complex opera-
tions such as behavior replacement.
Invasive AOP approaches use composition mechanisms
that allow developers to manipulate almost any structure
of the base program. This ability to manipulate the base
program structures is called invasiveness. Invasive AOP
provides several strategies to manipulate the base program.
These strategies range from less invasive such as the aug-
mentation of a procedure execution to more invasive ones
such as the replacement of a procedure execution. An inva-
siveness pattern is the characterization of invasive behavior,
i.e. the strategy or a combination of them to manipulate the
base program.
Invasive aspects are useful to introduce functionalities that
otherwise must be hardcoded into the base program. For ex-
ample, a system transaction concern is implemented using
an invasive aspect because it requires to stop executing the
intercepted behavior each time a transaction fails. However,
invasive aspects can also do harm to the base program. When
they introduce the functionalities they are designed for, they
can also introduce side effects, hence, generating unexpected
interactions.
The work presented in this paper is divided in two parts.
In the first part we illustrate the issues that can arise when
evolving an aspect-oriented program that is built with aspects
(some of them invasive). This is an special case of the AOSD-
Evolution paradox [17], which results to be aggravated in
presence of invasive aspects. We consider a distributed chat
application as a case study. First, we illustrate how invasive
aspects are useful to implement cross-cutting features in this
example. Then we evolve the system to enable authentication
in the application. While regression testing the application
errors emerge. We then propose an iterative process involv-
ing manual inspection and test execution in order to locate
the source of the problem. It allows us to track back the is-
sues to unexpected interactions between aspect and the pro-
gram. From this study and the debugging process we learn
that invasive aspects can introduce faults that emerge only
when evolving the system. We also learn that these faults
are difficult to locate and that debugging requires a complex
and error-prone process. Moreover, the crosscutting nature
of aspect makes difficult to reason about their impact in in-
teraction with the base program. This study demonstrates the
need to reason about expected interactions, and to control the
usage of invasive aspects.
In the second part of this work we propose a framework
for specifying the expected interactions in the base program
as well as the way in which aspects can be invasive. The
specification on aspects is based on a classification proposed
in previous work [11, 12]. This classification identifies differ-
ent patterns according to which AspectJ aspects can be inva-
sive. Based on this specification, the base program declares
which type of invasiveness it allows or forbids. We have de-
veloped a tool support for this framework. This tool analyzes
aspects to infer which invasive pattern they encapsulate. It
can also statically check that the aspects conform to the spec-
ification of the base program. Based on this approach, we
revisit the chat application and illustrate that specifying in-
teractions is useful to early detect when invasive aspect can
perform harmful. This experience expresses that it is worth
specifying the interactions between aspect and base program.
Besides, having specification reduces the time to locate and
fix issues consequence of unexpected interaction.
The contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
• An illustration through a rigorous inspection process on
a case study of the AOSD-Evolution paradox in pres-
ence of invasive aspects.
• A framework for the characterization of invasiveness
patterns on aspects and the specification of expected in-
vasiveness patterns in the base program.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explain the
chat application case study and a process to detect problems
introduced by invasive aspects. Section 3 explains our spec-
ification framework. Section 4 describes the implementation
of the specification framework. Section 5 revisits the case
study using the specification framework. Section 6 presents
the related work and finally section 7 concludes.
2. Motivating Case Study
In this section we illustrate the AOSD-evolution para-
dox [17] in presence of invasive aspects. Our goal is to show
that invasive aspects offer efficient mechanisms to implement
cross-cutting concerns, but that they can also introduce com-
plex errors in case of evolution.
To illustrate these issues, we present an example imple-
mented in Java and AspectJ. The example is a chat applica-
tion implemented with 5 aspects. We run system-level test
cases on the application to validate the initial version. Then,
we evolve the application adding authentication capabilities.
While testing the new version, we have detected errors.
We precisely discuss the analysis we perform to trace the
source of the error back to a wrong interaction between as-
pects and the base program. Based on these observations, we
motivate our approach to assist the validation and verification
of aspect-oriented programs.
2.1. A chat application
A chat application is a program that allows users to com-
municate with each other in real time. Our chat is composed
of two parts: a client and a server. The server handles client,
manages the communication between them and ensures their
uniqueness. The client transmits messages to the server that
are dispatched to other clients. The global behavior of a
chat application can be described as follows. Initially, the
server is waiting for clients. The establishment of communi-
cations is called association. The cease of communication is
called disassociation. Before associating a client, the server
checks the uniqueness of the client’s nickname. Clients us-
ing existing nicknames are not associated. Once associated,
the clients can send messages. Such messages are encrypted
and decrypted by the clients. Each client’s chat session is
recorded in a log file. The server also stores each session
into a log file. A graphical user interface (GUI) controls the
client and server behavior.
2.2. Initial version
We have implemented a chat in JavaTM. From the require-
ments documents, we separated the core concerns form the
cross-cutting concerns. Figure 1 shows the class diagram for
the core concerns of the chat application.
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Figure 1. Chat application class diagram
IClientIM and IServerIM are the remote interfaces
for the client and the server. The StandardClient class
realizes the client interface. The methods attach() and
detach() associate and dissociate the client to a server.
The method transmit(Message) notifies the GUI about
the arrival of a new message. Finally the method abort()
aborts the execution of the client. The StandardServer
class realizes the server interface. As in the client, the meth-
ods attach(Client) and detach(Client) associate
and dissociate a client. The send(Message) method dis-
patches the messages to other clients associated to the server.
The class Client is a container for the client’s information.
The class Message supports the messaging mechanism be-
tween client and server. Client and Server communicate us-
ing the Java RMI distribution mechanism [16]. The client
and the server GUI are implemented with the Standard Wid-
get Toolkit (SWT).
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2.3. Crosscutting concerns
We have identified the following crosscutting concerns
and implemented them with AspectJ.
• Message encryption encrypts and decrypts the incom-
ing/outgoing messages. Encryption/decryption occurs
just before the execution of the methods send and
transmit. It replaces the method arguments with the
encrypted/decrypted version of the message.
• Message logging logs the incoming/outgoing messages
for each user. Its behavior executes before transmitting
a message and after receiving a message (before the en-
cryption and after the decryption).
• Error handling captures the communication exceptions
and raises an alert indicating communication problems.
Its behavior executes after an exception of type remote
is thrown.
• Server logging logs the server activity in a file. Its be-
havior executes before and after all the methods of the
IServerIM interface. This is, it observes the execu-
tion of each method of the server.
• Nickname uniqueness checks the existence of only one
nickname in the server. Its behavior executes just before
the server association methods (attach and detach).
In the case of association, it checks the existence of the
client’s nickname on the server. If the nickname exists,
it throws an exception. Otherwise, it adds the name to
a list and executes the association normally. In the case
of dissociation, it removes the client’s nickname from a
list.
1 public aspect EncryptionAspect{
2 pointcut encryptMessage(String string):
3 execution(void IClientIM.send(String)) && args(string);
4 pointcut reencryptMessage(Message messg):
5 execution(void ∗.retransmit(Message)) && args(messg);
6 pointcut decryptMessage(Message messg):
7 execution(void IClientIM.transmit(Message)) && args(messg);
8 void around(String arg) : encryptMessage(arg){
9 arg = encrypt(arg);
10 proceed(arg);
11 }
12 void around(Message message) : reencryptMessage(message){
13 message.sContents=encrypt(message.sContents());
14 proceed(message);
15 }
16 void around(Message message) : decryptMessage(message){
17 message.sContents=decrypt(message.sContents());
18 proceed(message);
19 }
20 }
Listing 1. Implementation of the encryption
concern
Listing 1 shows the implementation of the Message en-
cryption concern. It is clear from the code that the three ad-
vices of this aspect are changing the argument values of the
intercepted methods (lines 9-10, 13-14, 17-18). The original
message is replaced by the encrypted/decrypted version and
then it is re-injected to the original method (proceed call).
This concern can only be implemented by using invasive as-
pects, otherwise it must be hard-coded in the base program.
1 public aspect UniqueNameAspect issingleton() {
2 public pointcut ensureUniqueness(IServerIM serv,Client client):
3 execution(∗ IServerIM.attach(Client)) &&
4 target(serv) && args(client);
5 public pointcut removeFromList(IServerIM serv,Client client):
6 execution(∗ IServerIM.detach(Client)) &&
7 target(serv) && args(client);
8 private static ArrayList nameList=new ArrayList();
9 int around(IServerIM serv,Client client)
10 throws UsedNameException:ensureUniqueness(serv,client){
11 int retValue=−1;
12 if(!nameList.contains(client.getSName())){
13 nameList.add(client.getSName());
14 retValue=proceed(serv,client);
15 }
16 else{ throw new UsedNameException();}
17 return retValue;
18 }
19 after(IServerIM serv,Client client): removeFromList(serv,client) {
20 nameList.remove(client.getSName());
21 }
22 }
Listing 2. Implementation of the unique nick-
name concern
Listing 2 shows the implementation of the Nickname
uniqueness concern. This aspect manages a list of the cur-
rently associated clients nicknames (nameList line 8). If
the actual client nickname does not exist in the list (line 12)
then it is added to the list (line 13) and the intercepted method
is executed. Otherwise, the method is never executed and an
exception is raised. This aspect conditionally replaces the
execution of the methods it intercepts. Analogously to the
Message encryption concern, it can only be implemented by
using invasive aspects.
These examples illustrates that invasive aspects help im-
plementing the crosscutting concerns that modify the flow or
data in the program.
2.4. Validating the initial version
We test the initial version with 7 system-level test scenar-
ios. Each scenario validates a different dimensions of the
system. These dimensions are summarized as follows:
1. The association mechanism between client and server.
2. The association mechanism supports multiple clients.
3. Clients can send/receive messages.
4. The server distributes the messages among clients.
5. The server detects clients named with an existing nick-
name.
6. The server association mechanism removes a used nick-
name when disassociating a client.
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7. The error handling mechanism handles the exceptions.
All the test scenarios pass on the initial version composed of
the core concern and 5 aspects.
2.5. Evolving the chat application
The initial version of the chat application allows any user
to associate with a server. Here, we add an authentication
mechanism to ensure that only the registered users are able
to associate with a server. We also want to ensure that the
clients of this new version are compatible with the old ver-
sion. As a consequence, a server without authentication
must be able to associate an authenticated client. Authenti-
cated servers must refuse the association of unauthenticated
clients. The chosen authentication protocol proceeds as fol-
lows: the client provides the nickname and password data to
the server. The server checks the nickname, password pair
internally. If the pair is authentic, then the server will asso-
ciate the client, otherwise the client is not associated.
In order to implement the evolution, we have
added two classes: AuthenticatedSever that ex-
tends StandardServer and overrides the method
attach(Client); AuthenticatedClient that
extends StandardClient and overrides the methods
transmit(Message) and receive(Message).
Additionally, we have performed minor changes in the class
Client and the client GUI adding support for password. Since
this evolution is only adding new behavior, the behavior for
the initial version should be kept. The crosscutting concerns
present in the initial version remains in this evolution with
no further implementation changes.
2.6. Validating the new version
We use the previous test scenarios for regression testing.
To do so, we replace the standard client/server with the au-
thenticated one. We also add 5 scenarios to validate the au-
thentication mechanism as well as the compatibility between
the two versions. The dimensions addressed by these scenar-
ios are summarized as follows:
8. The authentication mechanism detects invalid nick-
names and passwords.
9. The server detects void nicknames or password (or
both).
10. The client association mechanism is compatible with
the standard server.
11. The authenticated server is incompatible with the stan-
dard client.
12. The authenticated client messaging mechanism is able
to send messages to standard clients.
The results of the executing tests 1 to 12 are summarized in
table 1.
Table 1. Test results after evolution
Test 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
x x x x x x x X X X X x
2.7. Reasoning about the problems
Looking at the results of the test scenario execution it is
not easy to see where the problems are located. However,
a rigorous manual analysis will help detecting the problems.
We deal with the authenticated association issues and later
the compatibility issues.
The failure of the two first test cases tells that the client
cannot associate with the server or the server cannot authen-
ticate/associate the clients. The failure of tests 3, 4, 5, 6 and
7 are consequence of the failure of the test case 1 and 2. This
is because the preconditions cannot be fulfilled: there is no
connected client. The success of tests 8 and 9 provides no
information about the association mechanism. The success
of the first test is fundamental to obtain more information
about tests 3 to 7. This guides our analysis to examine the
association and the authentication mechanism.
After rigorously inspecting the base program we found no
errors, however, we need to take into account that the chat
runs with aspects. Before examining the aspects code, we
try to run the server without aspects that could interfere with
the association/authentication mechanism. We remove only
the invasive aspects because they are the only ones that can
change the final behavior of the application. Moreover, the
test scenarios that fail (except for the test case 5) evaluate
only the functionalities implemented in the base program.
Table 2 shows the test results after removing theNickname
uniqueness aspect. Now test cases 1 to 4 pass, however, the
test case 5 fails because it depends on the aspect. Remov-
ing the aspect helped to localize the problem (the Nickname
uniqueness aspect is interfering with the association mecha-
nism). Nevertheless, we still ignore the specific localization
of the failure and its cause.
After rigorously inspecting the aspect code and the places
it affects, we finally localize the specific cause of the prob-
lem. The problem occurs because the aspect captures a
wrong join point, the execution of the attach method in
the StandardServer class. The point-cut descriptor cap-
tures all the executions of the attach method in the server.
This, while the body of the advice realizing the crosscutting
concern is designed to be executed just once at each join
point. This means, once from the beginning to the end of
the method execution.
Table 2. Test results after removing the Nick-
name uniqueness aspect
Test 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
X X X X x X X X X X X x
Figure 2 depicts schematically the association
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Figure 2. Schematic view of the association flow. (a) association without the Nickname uniqueness aspect.
(b) association with the Nickname uniqueness aspect.
flow without (a) and with (b) the Nickname unique-
ness aspect. In the case with the aspect (b), it cap-
tures the first call that performs the authentication
(AuthenticationServer.attach(client)).
Then, the aspect finds that the client nickname is not in the
registry (exist(client.name)=false) and adds its
name into the registry (add(client.name)). The aspect
also captures the second call that performs the association
(StandardServer.attach(client)). It is here
where the aspect finds that the name exists in the registry and
throws an exception. This problem is hard to detect because
it can be a combination of a failure in the point-cut descriptor
and a limited implementation of the advice. To solve this
problem we could modify the advice implementation or
the point-cut descriptor. However, we think that the advice
implementation realizes in a proper manner the crosscutting
concern. Therefore, we modify the point-cut description.
Once we had detected and fixed the association problem,
we explore the compatibility problems. The failure of test
12 is due to a compatibility problem when sending/receiv-
ing messages. Following the procedure we used to localize
cause of the association issue we localize the case of the com-
patibility issue. The problem is localized in the Encryption
aspect and is analogous to the association problem. The ad-
vice captures the execution of the messaging methods twice,
therefore, it encrypts/decrypts the messages twice. On the
other hand, the standard client encrypts/decrypts the mes-
sages only once. We solve this problem by changing the
point-cut descriptor to match only one execution each time.
2.8. Discussion
Through this experiment we have shown that despite the
features provided by invasive aspects, they can hamper the
software evolution. The main issue is that it is very hard to
reason about the aspects impact on the final application, and
it is very hard to trace them as the source of the problems to
aspects.
The successive execution of a set of test scenarios and the
manual inspection of code helped us tracing the problems to
aspects. However, this process is tedious, time consuming
and error prone. Besides, there is no generic formula to trace
this kind of problems. In the chat application, the problems
were localized by removing the aspect. This was possible
because the test scenarios we used were testing the base pro-
gram functionalities. Nevertheless, it is not always possible
to simply remove the aspects.
Actually there is a missing element in the AOP support.
The tedious process we performed tells us that there is a need
to abstract from code to reason about the interactions be-
tween aspects and the base program. To tackle this issue, we
propose a framework for specifying the (1) the invasiveness
patterns that aspects realize, and (2) the invasiveness patterns
expected on the base program. This means specifying the
interaction between aspects and base program. Such speci-
fication assist developers to localize and solve problems due
to faulty invasive aspects.
3. Specifying aspects-base program interaction
The specification of interactions between aspects and base
program consists of two parts. In the first, we characterize
aspects with specific invasiveness patterns (Aspect specifica-
tions). In the second, we specify the invasiveness patterns the
base program allows from aspects.
For the first we propose to use our previous work [12] on
classifying invasive aspects. For the second we propose to
specify assertions that allow/forbid invasiveness patterns to
interact with the base program elements.
The goal of these specifications is to obtain information
about the potential unexpected interactions that invasive as-
pects can produce. Such information will help developers to
reason about the harmfulness of aspects. Therefore, it assists
developer to track potential faults (introduced by invasive as-
pects).
3.1. Aspect specification
In [11, 12] we present a classification of invasive aspects.
Such classification is the result of an analysis of the invasive
mechanisms that AspectJ [6] provides. It allows us to iden-
tify specific invasiveness patterns and therefore abstract from
code. Such abstraction helps reasoning about the interaction
of aspects and the base program. We use this classification to
characterize aspects with invasiveness patterns.
In AspectJ, aspects crosscut the base program at two lev-
els. At class level (aspect) modifying the program structure
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and at method level (advice) manipulating the method’s be-
havior. Our classification addresses these two levels. In the
following, we list the classification elements with a brief de-
scription. Aspect invasiveness patterns are marked with ‡,
and advice invasiveness patterns are marked with †.
† Augmentation: After crosscutting, the body of the inter-
cepted method is always executed. The advice aug-
ments the behavior of the method it crosscuts with new
behavior that does not interfere with the original behav-
ior. Examples of this kind of advices are those realizing
logging, monitoring, traceability, etc.
† Replacement: After crosscutting, the body of the inter-
cepted method is never executed. The advice com-
pletely replaces the behavior of the method it crosscuts
with new behavior. This kind of advices eliminate a part
of the base program.
† Conditional replacement: After crosscutting, the body of
the intercepted method is not always executed. The
advice conditionally invokes the body of the method
and potentially replaces its behavior with new behavior.
Examples of this kind of advices are advices realizing
transaction, access control, etc.
† Multiple: After crosscutting, the body of the intercepted
method is executed more than once. The advice invokes
two or more time the body of the method it crosscuts
generating potentially new behavior.
† Crossing: After crosscutting, the advice invokes the body
of a method (or several methods) that it does not inter-
cepts. The advice have a dependency to the class own-
ing the invoked method(s).
† Write: After crosscutting, the advice writes an object field.
This access breaks the protection declared for the field
and can modify the behavior of the underlying compu-
tation.
† Read: After crosscutting, the advice reads an object field.
This access breaks the protection declared for the field
and can potentially expose sensitive data.
† Argument passing: After crosscutting, the advice modifies
the argument values of the method it crosscuts and then
invokes the body of the method. The body of the method
always executes at least once.
‡ Hierarchy: The aspect modifies the declared class hierar-
chy. For example, the aspect adds a new parent interface
to an existing one.
‡ Field addition: The aspect adds new fields to an existing
class declaration. These fields depending on their pro-
tection can be acceded by referencing an object instance
of the affected class.
‡ Operation addition: The aspect adds new methods to an
exiting class declaration. These methods depending on
their protection can be acceded by referencing an object
instance of the affected class.
All the advices of the Encryption aspects (Listing 1) are clas-
sified Argument passing. This because they modify the argu-
ment values of the methods they intercept. The advices of the
Nickname uniqueness aspect (Listing 2) are classified Con-
ditional Replacement (lines 9-18) and Augmentation (lines
19-21). The first conditionally replaces the execution of the
methods it intercepts, the second is orthogonal to the meth-
ods it intercepts.
3.2. Core specification
We specify the base program (core) by asserting the pat-
terns of invasiveness allowed/forbidden to interact with it.
Such specification emanates from the base program design-
ers and declares an expected interaction.
Aspects crosscut the base program at the level of classes
(modifying the class structure), methods (modifying the de-
clared behavior) and fields (accessing the data contained in
object fields). This motivates us to attach specifications to
each one of these elements. By default (implicit specifica-
tion) only the patterns Augmentation, Crossing, Read are al-
lowed to advise the base program. This is because a priori
these classes do not alter the program flow, data or structure,
hence, they are less harmful than the others.
...
+attach(client:Client):int
....
...
- clients:Set(Client)
... 
StandardServer
c
a
b
Figure 3. Base program specification covering
Specification for classes: Specify the invasiveness pat-
terns allowed englobing two levels. The first is related to
the class structure modifications like the addition of a field.
The second is related with methods and fields declared in
the class. A class is specified with an allowed invasiveness
patterns that applies to its fields and methods. This specifica-
tion can allow any invasiveness pattern forbidden by default,
and forbid any invasiveness pattern allowed by default. This
specification corresponds to (a) in figure 3 covering all the
class definition.
Specification for fields: Specify the invasiveness patterns
that a field allows in terms of how advices access it. This
specification can allow Write and forbid Read. This speci-
fication corresponds to (b) in figure 3 covering only a field
definition.
Specification for methods: Specify the invasiveness pat-
terns allowed on a specific method. It can allow Replace-
ment, Conditional replacement, Multiple, Write, Argument
passing. It can forbid Augmentation, Crossing, Read. This
specification corresponds to (c) in figure 3 covering only a
method definition.
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It is worth mentioning that a class specification can be
reused in the case of the inheritance. For example, The class
B extends class A. If C is the specification of A, and B is not
explicitly specified, then C is the specification of B.
In the case of conflicts between the specifications of fields,
methods and classes we propose the following: The specifi-
cation of fields is always used if it exists. If a method is
specified (explicitly), its specification is used instead of the
global.
3.3. Specification matching
We compare the core and aspect specifications in order
to detect when aspects or advices violate the core specifica-
tions. An aspect or an advice violates a core specification
when it realizes invasiveness patterns that the core specifi-
cation forbid. This gives us information about the invasive
aspects harmfulness. Such information is used to assist the
developer to reason about the impact of aspects on the com-
posed program.
We detect violations of specification in the following way:
At the aspect level, for each aspect we obtain the classes it
targets adding fields, methods or modifying the hierarchy.
Then, we compare the specification of forbidden patterns on
each class with the specification of the aspect. At the advice
level, for each advice we obtain the methods it advises. Then,
we compare the specification of forbidden patterns on each
method with the specification of the advice. For the advices
accessing fields, the matching is analogous to the previous.
4. A specification framework for interactions
We have implemented a tool for matching specification as
well a language to express the base program specifications
called ABIS (Aspect-Base Interaction Specification)1ABIS
is built on top of the AJDT eclipse plug-in and is completely
integrated with eclipse. After a short presentation of the
global structure of ABIS we detail how each aspect and ad-
vice is automatically classified. Then we describe how to
specify the base program with the expected invasiveness pat-
terns.
Figure 4 presents the ABIS’ organization. We extend the
AspectJ AST Visitor (1) in order to create a simplified
(SAST) version of the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST). ABIS
obtains information about the structure of the program (as-
pects and base program) from AJDT and builds a model of
the program structure (2). This model contains the relations
between aspects and the base program (advised and intro-
duced element relations). An automatic classification pro-
cess inspects the SAST and classifies each aspect and advice
according to its invasiveness pattern (3). Then the model and
the classified advices are checked following the previously
1Available at http://contract4aj.gforge.inria.fr
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Figure 4. ABIS structure diagram
presented matching process (4). If specification violations
are found, then they are reported to the eclipse GUI (5).
4.1. Automatic classification of aspects
ABIS is able to automatically identify invasiveness pat-
terns in aspects and advices according to their de-facto prop-
erties. Then, by using the identified patterns, aspects and ad-
vices are classified according to the classification presented
in section 3.1.
advice
parameter arg
body
assignment
lhs arg
rhs encrypt call
argument arg
proceed call
paratemer arg
1
2
3
Figure 5. SAST of Encryption aspect, Listing 1,
lines 9-12
Figure 5, shows the SAST of the first advice of the En-
cryption aspect (Listing 1, lines 9-12). The root node of the
SAST corresponds to the advice declaration. From the root
node, we find the parameter declaration and the advice body
node. The children of the body node are the statements de-
clared on the advice. The node assignment corresponds
to the assignment in line 10 of Listing 1. The node proceed
call represents the call to the proceed(arg) method
(line 11 of Listing 1) (it executes the intercepted method)
and its children are the arguments it receives.
The classification algorithm applied to the Encryption as-
pect is the following:
1. Initially, select all the advice argument nodes (step 1,
argument arg).
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2. Traverse the SAST searching for the nodes representing
a call to the proceed method (proceed node).
(a) If all the arguments nodes reference the ad-
vice parameter nodes, then select it (step 2,
proceed(arg)).
(b) If the proceed arguments are different from the ad-
vice parameters, then classify the advice as Pa-
rameter passing.
3. Starting from the last selected proceed node, select the
assignment nodes on top of it. If the left hand side (lhs)
of an assignment references one of the advice arguments
(step 3, arg=Encrypt(arg)), then classify the ad-
vice as Parameter passing.
This algorithm represents the set of rules used to identify
the Parameter passing invasiveness pattern. In general, in-
vasiveness patterns are identified by applying a set of rule to
the advice SAST.
foreach root.childs as node do
 select into argument node.type="argument" end select
 select into proceed node.type="proceed" then
  foreach proceed as proc do
    if NOT argument.contains (proc.childs) then
       classification:=classification + "argument passing"
    end if
  end foreach
 end select
...
SAST Classiﬁcation rules
Match
Figure 6. Automatic advice classification
Figure 6 depicts the automatic classification process or
advices. The process proceeds as follows: once obtained
the advices SASTs a set of identification rules are applied to
them. The results of this inquiry are the invasiveness patterns
that the inspected SAST realizes. For example, an identifica-
tion rule can check whether the left hand side of an assign-
ment node is a reference to an object field, and then detected
the invasiveness patternWrite.
Aspects invasive patterns are detected according to the as-
pect structural declarations. For example, if an aspect de-
clares Inter-Type field, then the detected invasive pattern is
Field Addition.
4.2. Writing specification in the base pro-
gram
The base program specification is represented as meta-
information by using Java 5 annotations [2]. The param-
eterized annotation @Spec([allow=..|forbid=..])
specifies the expected invasiveness pattern in the base pro-
gram. It can be attached to classes, fields and methods, and
the possible values for its parameters vary as described in
section 3.2.
The parameters allow and forbid are exclusive, i.e.
only one can be used in each specification. The allow pa-
rameter indicates the invasiveness patterns allowed to inter-
act with the base program. The default policy is to allow the
non-invasiveness patterns Augmentation, Crossing and Read.
Analogously the forbid parameter indicates the invasive-
ness patterns forbidden to interact with the base program.
1 @Spec(allow={"ConditionalReplacement"})
2 public synchronized int attach(Client client)
3 throws RemoteException {
4 ...
5 }
Listing 3. attachmethod specified with an an-
notation
Listing 3 shows the attach method of the standard
server specified with an annotation (line 2). Finally, this
method allows advices realizing the following patterns to ad-
vise it: Augmentation, Crossing, Conditional replacement
and Read. All the other patterns are forbidden.
4.3. Contribution of the ABIS framework
ABIS statically computes and gives information, at
compile-time, about the specification violation. This infor-
mation is a useful and valuable:
1. Feedback for developers in the process of writing ad-
vices a specifying the base program.
2. For verifying an aspect-oriented program when aspects
and the base program are developed separately.
3. For verifying an aspect-oriented program when aspects
or the base program evolve.
The compile-time feature of the tool is also a drawback. The
current implementation is unable to detect and check dy-
namic join points (for example using the if keyword in As-
pectJ).
5. Case study revisited
In this section we revisit the case study presented in sec-
tion 2 by specifying the interaction between aspects and base
program. Then, we use these specifications to spot and solve
the problems that arise after the base program evolution.
5.1. Specifying the initial version
We annotate the initial version of the chat application
specifying the allowed invasiveness pattern. The annotations
we added allow the invasiveness patterns that interact safely
with the base program. Therefore, only the advices realizing
the specified patterns can advise the base program.
1 public class StandardClientImpl implements IClientIM{
2 @Spec(allow={"ArgumentPassing"})
3 public synchronized void transmit(Message message) ...
4 @Spec(allow={"ArgumentPassing"})
5 public void send(String sContents){ ... }
6 @Spec(allow={"ArgumentPassing"})
7 private void retransmit(Message message){ ... }
8 ...
8
9 }
Listing 4. StandarClient with annotations
Listing 3 and 4 present the fragment of the specified meth-
ods. The methods send, transmit and retransmit
were specified to allow the invasiveness pattern Argument
passing. Aspect were automatically specified by ABIS.
Thanks to these specifications, ABIS informs that no aspect
is violating the base program specifications. Furthermore,
the addition of annotations is transparent for the tests we ex-
ecute, hence, the test results are not affected.
5.2. Evolution with specification, problems
detection and solving
After specifying the initial version of the chat applica-
tion, we evolve it as explained in section 2.5. As a result
of this evolution, ABIS reports that some aspects are violat-
ing the base program specifications. The reports indicate that
the aspects EncryptionAspect and UniqueName are
violating the specifications on AuthenticatedClient
(attach method) and AuthenticatedServer (send
and transmit methods) respectively. This means that po-
tentially unexpected behavior can emerge from the weavage
of these invasive aspects advising new join points.
Using this information we trace unexpected interactions
to the violator advices (problems presented in section 2.7).
Knowing the violating pattern helps us reasoning about the
causes of the unexpected interaction, hence, reasoning about
the source of the problem. For example, the violating pattern
Conditional Replacement tells us that something is wrong
because it is possible that a method, which must always exe-
cute, sometimes will not be executed.
The further correction of the problems is a developer de-
cision, however, the violated specification may help making
the solution. In this case, we have applied the same proce-
dure used in section 2.7, i.e. change the point-cut descriptors.
Once applied the corrections, ABIS reports that no specifica-
tion is violated and aspects are valid in relation with the base
program specifications.
5.3. Discussion
Specifying interactions gives feedback about the harmful-
ness of aspects. This information assists developers in the
process of creating an aspect-oriented program and ensur-
ing that aspects perform as expected. It also helps develop-
ers to be conscious about the aspects they write and enforces
the reasoning about the interaction between aspects and base
program.
The violation of an specification indicates that a developer
may review the code of the violator aspects and reason about
their impact on the base program. Besides, specifying inter-
actions reduce the effort and time required to locate faulty
aspects because there is no need to successively execute a set
of tests. We thinks that all these reasons justify the effort and
time involved in specifying (annotating) the base program.
The Open Closed Principle [9] describes that a module/-
class should be open for extension but closed for modifica-
tion. Of all the principles of object oriented design, this is the
most important. It means that we should write modules so
that they can be extended without requiring them to be mod-
ified. In other words, we must be able to change the mod-
ules behavior without changing their code. Our framework is
completely coherent with this principle. Aspects offer a new
way to extend the behavior of classes without modifying their
code (classes are opened). Therefore, developers have to an-
ticipate these potential extensions and specify which kind of
behavior modification (invasiveness pattern) is allowed.
6. Related work
The characterization of aspects has already been explored.
In [14] categories of direct and indirect interactions between
aspects and methods are identified. Direct interaction is
whether an advice interferes with the execution of a method,
whereas indirect is whether advices and methods may read-
/write the same fields. This classification is similar to ours,
however, it addresses a different dimension. We identify
invasiveness patterns instead of direct/indirect interactions.
Moreover, in our work the identification of invasive patterns
is only a portion of a whole specification framework. In [7]
aspects are characterized among Spectative, Regulatory and
Invasive aspects according to their invasiveness. This classi-
fication is similar to ours, however, our characterization of is
more fine grained.
Several approach have been proposed to control the inter-
actions between aspects and the base program. Spectators
and Assistants [4] proposes to control interactions by speci-
fying the invasive aspects that can advise the base program.
It classifies aspect among Spectators (non invasive advices)
and Assistants (invasive advices). Then, the base program
explicitly demands the assistance of assistant aspects (identi-
fied by their names). We propose the same type of specifica-
tions, but we address a finest granularity and abstraction by
referring to invasiveness patterns instead of specific invasive
aspects.
Open Modules [1] is a system that focuses on the expo-
sure of specific join-points. This approach hides all the join-
points, then each module declares the join-point it will ex-
pose. Open Modules goes in a similar direction than our
work. However, we perform this task in a very different way.
OpenModules exposes join-points without distinguishing the
aspects advising them, whereas we expose joint-point to as-
pects realizing specific invasiveness patterns. Moreover, our
approach is intended to verify and validate aspect-oriented
programs and assist developers when creating aspects.
XPI [5] are interfaces that mediate between aspects and
the base program. They establish a set of design rules to im-
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plement aspects and the base program in such a way that the
evolution is coordinated through the XPI. This approach re-
straint the manners in which developers may write programs.
Instead, to check whether advices may be harmful to the base
program, then advising developers to check the potential un-
expected interaction introduced by invasive aspects.
An approach to assist developers is proposed in [15].
Through an analysis that compares the changes in the set of
matched join-points for two different version of a program
it reveals unexpected changes in the matching behavior of
point-cuts. This analysis serves to assist developers finding
bugs introduced by broken point-cuts. This work is close
to ours. However, the dimensions in which this is accom-
plished are very different. Our approach advises developer
about the potential undesired interactions introduced by inva-
sive aspects instead of broken point-cuts. Moreover, our ap-
proach require the specification of the base program, which
we think enforces the reasoning about the interactions with
aspects.
7. Conclusions
The evolution of aspect-oriented programs is a compli-
cated issue because necessary interactions of one version can
introduce issues after evolution. This occurs as a conse-
quence of the AOSD-Evolution paradox and invasive aspects.
Through the evolution of an aspect-oriented chat application
we have shown that tracing problems to unexpected interac-
tions is a long and tedious process. Such a process involves
rigorous manual inspection of code and the execution of sev-
eral test scenarios.
This paper tackles this problem by specifying the inter-
actions between aspect and the base program. Aspects are
specified with the invasiveness patterns they realize, and the
base program with assertions allowing or forbidding inva-
siveness patterns. The violations of these specifications are
used to alert developers about the risk introduced by unex-
pected interactions. This assists developers reviewing the
harmful code and to reason about its interaction with the base
program. By specifying and evolving the chat application we
have shown that specifying interactions reduces the time and
effort necessary to locate problems introduced by unexpected
interactions.
The specification of aspect-oriented programs improves
their maintenance and evolvability. It also increases the con-
fidence that developers have on aspect. This because devel-
opers can ensure that critical parts of the base program will
not be modified unexpectedly by future addition of aspects.
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